Most of the studies regarding the determination of executive compensation are based on developed countries and mainly focused on CEO compensation. Determination of board compensation is relatively ignored in the literature. This paper examines the effect of corporate governance, firm performance and corporate diversification on board as well as CEO compensation and its components in the context of an emerging economy, India, where managerial market is yet to develop. I use panel data of 462 firms from the year 1997-2002 of Indian manufacturing sector. This paper finds that board compensation largely depend on current and past year firm performance and diversification, whereas CEO compensation depends only on current year firm performance. Among the personal attributes of the CEO, only in-firm experience has significant influence on CEO compensation. This finding contradicts the extant studies, where current and past year firm performance, age, experience and education of the CEO are important factors for determining CEO compensation.
Introduction
Determination of board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has been a topic of great interest in academics and the business community. Large amount of theoretical literature have been developed to determine the optimal executive compensation contracts that link pay with the variation of firm performance. Such contracts aim to align the interest of managers (agents) with the interest of shareholders (principals). These theoretical propositions have been spawned by several empirical studies. CEO looks after the day-to-day management of the firm. All the major decisions or strategies are taken together by the board, especially, the executive directors of the board.
CEO is just a part of the board. But, determination of the board compensation is ignored in the literature. Theoretical justification regarding determination of board compensation is not very straightforward. Board is the monitor of the firm. Who will determine the compensation of the monitor? Is the compensation of the board aligned with performance of the firm, as it is proposed for the CEO? This paper tries to answer some of these unanswered questions in the context of an emerging economy, where most of the firms are family owned and large number of board members are related to founder of the firm. In India, more than 90% of the board compensation goes to the set of executive/inside directors. Compensation of the directors is determined at the annual general meeting each year. In this paper I examine the effect of different measures of firm performance, diversification and board structure on the board compensation, and its components, and on the CEO compensation in an emerging economy namely, India. Substantial awareness about the importance of internal monitoring has been noticed not only in developed countries but also in developing countries in the past few years. In US from the period of 1971 to 1994, external representative in the corporate board, level of incentive to the external directors and external pressure on directors by institutional shareholders increased, whereas average size of the board decreased over the year (Huson et al. (2001) ). Similar to the Cadbury committee report (1992) in UK, in developing economies, compensation of CEO and other directors has become a matter of great concern of different committees like Kumar Mangalam Birla committee report (1999) in India, King committee report (2002) in South Africa etc. These committee reports time and again argue that all compensation paid to the directors including independent directors should be fixed by the board of directors and approved by the shareholders in general meetings. There should be some limit on the each component of the compensation including stock options. In India, till 2002, there was an upper limit of Rs.20 thousand for the fees for the non-executive directors (NED). From 2003, this limit more difficult, because CEO essentially has the power to hire or remove other non-executive directors (NED). Such board members take the role of passive advisors especially when it concerns the compensation of CEO. Main et al. (1995) find if the CEO is appointed before the other directors are appointed, then the levels of compensation will be higher compared to if he/she is appointed after the Board of directors. They argue that when CEO also holds the Chairman post he/she gets higher remuneration due to their higher responsibility.
has been lifted up to Rs.0.2 million to attract more intelligent and competitive professional as NED.
Most of the empirical studies on CEO compensation and corporate governance till date have been with respect to developed countries like US, UK, Canada, Japan, Italy etc.
Several economists have already argued with sufficient force that there are some basic institutional structural differences in firm structure, market and organisation between developed and developing countries. In the emerging economies managerial markets are not well developed; there is too much intervention from the family of the founder;
corporate law like code of corporate governance, bankruptcy law is very weak and accounting standard is also not up to the mark as compared to international standard and there is no uniformity in the accounting across the firms. This paper is the first attempt to make a comprehensive analysis on the determinants of board as well as CEO compensation in the context of an emerging and newly liberalized economy, India.
This paper tries to analyse four broad issues. The first issue is, whether the level of executive compensation and its different components is determined on the basis of firm performance. Accounting measures in developing countries are criticised on the ground of highly manipulating accounting standards. Therefore, I use both accounting based (return on assets (ROA)) as well as market based (Tobin's Q), current as well as previous year, measures of performance in my analysis. It is also argued that in emerging economies that there is no clear distinction between ownership and control. In India very often CEOs are selected from the relatives of the founder and there is a common fear that they build up their wealth at the cost of shareholders. The second issue is, what is the effect of size and composition of the board on compensation of the board and CEO?
Added to this, I also find out the effect of identification of the CEO i.e., if the CEO is relative of the founder, if the CEO is Chairman or there are more than one CEO in the firm on the compensation of the board and CEO.
A major basis of the board and CEO compensation package, which has received very less attention in the literature, is informational rent. This informational rent increases with the increase in operational difficulties of the firm and in-firm experience of the CEO. The operational difficulties rise with the size and diversification of the firm.
Therefore the third question in the paper is, how the compensation of the board as well as The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discuss the literature on the effect of internal monitoring, CEO characteristics, firm performance and diversification on board and CEO Compensation. Section 3 discusses the empirical model, methodology and variables used in this paper. Data and descriptive statistics of the variables as preliminary data analysis are discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents the preliminary data analysis. Empirical results are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Theoretical and Empirical Background of Determining CEO and

Board Compensation
According to the incentive wage theory under incomplete information on capability of the CEO, compensation of the CEO mainly depends on five broad factors, namely internal monitoring, firm performance, firm complexity, personal attributes of the 6 Rose and Shepard (1998) 
Other firm characters include R&D expenditure, advertisement expenditure, firm age etc.
Firm performance
Most of the earlier studies on determinant of managerial pay are focused on role of firm size on the compensation of the CEO. As the firm become larger in size the complexity in operation also increases. Rosen (1992) provides a theoretical justification for the positive relation between pay and firm size. There are several evidences in the literature, which prove the above proposition 8 .
Relatively recent literature is focused on the effect of firm performance on the compensation of the CEO. It has now become empirically proven fact that CEO pay increases with the increase in the performance of the firm 9 . For instance Rose and Shepard 1997; Brick et al. 2002 used current as well as past performance of the firm to study its influence on the compensation of the CEO. In Indian context, Bhattacherjee et al. (1998) find that accounting based performance measure is not a significant determinant of the change in compensation of the CEO. Rather market based measures such as present and past value of Tobin's Q have significant effect on the change in Compensation of the CEO. They also find that pay performance sensitivity rises after the liberalisation for the large firms. Therefore, I have taken both accounting as well as market based firm performance measure in the current and past year.
Firm specific risk is another potential determinant of board and CEO compensation. I have taken standard deviation of stock return of last 30 days of the financial year of the firm (RISK). There are lots of window dressing go on during the last month of the financial year and it has significant effect on setting the compensation of 8 Roberts 1956; Murphy 1985; Zhou 2000; Ryan and Wiggins 2001. 9 Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; Masson 1971; Jensen and Murphy 1990. board as well as CEO. It is expected that as the RISK of the firm increase the compensation of the board as well as CEO would decline 10 .
Firm performance = m (ROA t , Tobin's Q t , ROA t-1 , Tobin's Q t-1 , Sales, Risk)
Internal Monitoring
The board of directors are primarily responsible for internal monitoring. They help to resolve the agency problem that arises due to separation of ownership and control of the firm. Outside directors are supposed to be more efficient monitors of management and are the key decision makers especially when it concerns the compensation of the CEO. They are quite concerned about their reputation (Fama and Jensen (1983) ). On the other hand inside directors are less likely to be the efficient monitor, because their interest is tied up with the CEO and all board members (Weisbach (1988) ). A set of empirical studies argues that proportion of outside directors has positive effect on the compensation of the CEO. For instance, Core et al. (1999) find that if the proportion of 'gray' outside directors, non-executive directors (NED) appointed by CEO, increases then the compensation of the CEO also increases. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) do not find any significant relation between proportion of outside directors and compensation. There is also argument in the literature that due to peer culture of the directors, board avoids any conflicts with CEO and as a result CEOs determine the business strategy on their own (Jensen, 1993) . Small board operate more efficiently than the larger board and thus, monitor more effectively (Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) ).
In emerging economies, India, corporate board in most of the firms are not independent. These boards are highly influenced by the founder(s). Therefore, the effect of size and composition of the board on the compensation of the CEO and board may not be similar to that of in the context of developed countries. In the emerging economies management and ownership are not very distinct. Very often there are multiple number of CEO in the board and some of them are related to the founder of the firm also.
Monitoring the CEO also becomes difficult and as a result the compensation of the CEO cum Chairman increases (Brickley et al. 1997) , however Ryan and Wiggins (2001) Duru (2002) calculate factor score of geographical diversification by ratio of foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales and number of geographical segments and find that geographical diversification has positive effect on CEO compensation.
Firm complexity = h (product diversification, geographical diversification)
Personal attributes of the CEO
Age, experience and educational qualification are the key identifier of competent and talented CEO, therefore, important determinants of CEO compensation.
Age: Compensation of the CEO increases with his. Gibbons and Murphy (1991), Dechow and Sloan (1991) argue that older CEOs have the incentive to choose the project, which will mature before their retirement i.e., they go for long-term project, which is relatively safe. For sake of reputation younger CEOs focus on short-term and relatively riskier project (Hirshleifer (1993) ). Rayan and Wiggins (2001) find a concave relation between cash and bonus payment and age of the CEO.
Experience: Murphy (1985) suggests that the ability of a manager at the beginning of the career is not known. As he progresses he becomes more experienced and the compensation of the manager or CEO also increases. Palia (2001) find that the compensation of the CEO increases exponentially with the increase in number of years the CEO has been working as CEO. Since, most of the CEOs in India are related to the founder of the firm they start their career from the same firm or some other firm but from the same business group. Therefore, I take the number of years the CEO is working in the firm, in-firm experience, as a proxy for experience. There is one more advantage of taking in firm experience into consideration. This gives the idea about the rent for having internal information about the firm compared to a new comer. In Indian context very limited studies has been done in the context of Mincerian earning function. Datta and Rao (1985) found that education and experience are important factor in determining the compensation of managers.
Education: Compensation of the CEO could potentially depends on the level of education. In this paper I consider total year of schooling as a proxy for level of education. I calculate the level of education as the years of education = age -experience -6, as a typical Indian child starts schooling at the age of 6. This method has been used by Saha and Sarkar (1999) . Sarkar and Sen (1996) do not find any one-to-one monotonic function between educational qualification and earning of managers.
Research and Development expenditure and Advertisement Expenditure
Managers have larger interest in short term performance rather than long term performance of the firm. Therefore, opportunistic managers reduce the expenditure on R&D due to two reasons 12 : (1) Horizontal Problem: when CEO is close to retirement he is least interested in investing in long term investment. (2) Cover-up Problem: When the firm faces loss, mangers quickly cut down the R&D expenditure to cover the loss.
Therefore, to reduce the opportunistic reduction in R&D expenditure, shareholders are expected to reward the CEO for R&D spending, because it also gives some tax exemption.
Similarly I also included intensity of advertisement expenditure as another intangible asset, advertisement expenditure. In the literature intensity of advertisement expenditure has positive effect on the compensation of the CEO as well as board (e.g. Palia 2001; Brick et al. 2002) .
Other firm character = n(R&D Expenditure, Advertisement Expenditure, Firm Age) (7) Substituting equations (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) in equation (1) and (2) 
Data:
Data on the compensation of the board as well as CEO and other executives of Return on Assets (ROA), an accounting based measure and the second measure is Adjusted Tobin's Q (ADJQ), a market based measure of performance. ROA is defined as the ratio of gross profit (i.e., profit before depreciation, interest and taxes) to book value of total assets. Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of market value of equity and market value debt to replacement costs of firm's assets. In India, as some other developing countries, there is no active market for debt. Thus instead of market value of debt, book value of debt had to be used in the computation in the computation of Tobin's Q (Adjusted) 13 . I used both current as well as previous years of both measure of firm performance 14 for this analysis.
Characteristics of the Board: Board character has been taken into account through five variables as proxy for corporate governance in India. First one is size of the board (BOARD SIZE) i.e., total number of directors in the board. The second is the proportion of non-executive directors in the board (PROP_NED) i.e., ratio of number of nonexecutive directors to total number of directors in the board. Third measures is, whether CEO of the firm is also the Chairman of the board as captured by the dummy variable D_CH. The fourth measure is, if CEO is relative to the founder of the firm, captured by another dummy variable D_REL. Finally the fifth measure is also a dummy variable D_MORE_CEO, which takes the value 1 if number of CEO in the firm is more than one.
Measurement of Diversification:
In this paper I consider mainly three types of diversification measures. The first measure is, COUNT i.e., number of unique three digit products that a firm produces each year. This is the simplest measure of diversification.
The second measure is DIVERSE. This is a more involving index, constructed by following Rose and Shepard (1997) , where I define the DIVERSE as follows:
The third measure of diversification is LOCATION i.e., the total number of places/sites, where the firm has plants. These indicate how much the firm is geographically diversified within the domestic territory.
Other economic determinants of level of compensation: Other than the above variables of interest compensation of the board as well as CEO are also dependent on many other variables. Large firms have greater complexity and growth opportunity.
These firms demand more competitive CEO and other directors so, it is expected that compensation of the directors in large firm will be higher than relatively smaller one.
Thus I take log of sales (LSALES) as a control for size of the firm. Firm risk regarding the share price in the stock market is also a potential economic determinant 15 of the level of compensation so, I included standard deviation of the stock return of the last month of the financial year (RISK) as another control variable. To take care of firm specific heterogeneity, ADVINT (ratio of advertisement expenditure to sales), R&DINT (ratio of
Research and Development expenditure to sales) and age of the firm (FIRM_AGE) are included 16 . To see the differential effect of the firms belongs to business group I also included group dummy (D_GROUP), which take the value 1 if the firm is from business group. Finally, I included nineteen industry specific dummy variables as controls for industry specific differences in demand for managerial talents.
Empirical Model and methodology:
I have used pooled model with the industry specific and time specific fixed effect for determining the total board compensation and for determination of CEO (10) where i denotes the firm and t denotes the year. α is the intercept. All these equations are estimated through fixed effect in time and Industry unbalanced panel method. α t is the time varying intercept.
The compensation paid to the board is broadly divided into five components:
salary, commission (performance based incentives), provident fund (retirement benefits), perquisites (other benefits) and sitting fees (paid to non-executive directors). Increase in one component of compensation can lead to decrease in one or all other components of compensation. Therefore, this paper determines log of salary, commission, perquisites and sitting fees by SUR method. where I have taken all the firms together, followed by column 2 and 3 for large firm and small firm cases. If the sale of a firm is larger than Rs.2 billion, I consider it as a large firm. All the CEOs in India can be broadly classified into two categories: relative of the founder of the firm and non-relative. The fourth column shows the cases where CEO is relative of the founder group. The last three columns i.e., column fifth to seventh, give the descriptive statistic of the sample, which is divided according to the number of products produced by firms (COUNT). In fifth column I consider the sample of firms where COUNT ≤ 3. In sixth column I consider the sample of firms where 3<COUNT ≤ 9.
In the final column I consider the case where COUNT > 9.
Overall average total compensation of the board for my sample of firms is around Rs.5.3 million, for the large firms it is Rs.7.6 million and for the small firms it is only Rs.2.5 million. If we convert the compensation as a percentage of sales, then small firm's compensation is not small. When the CEO is relative of the founders then board receives higher compensation, Rs.6.9 million. Average proportion of salary and commission to the total compensation of the board in all firms case are 52 percent and 18 percent respectively. Except proportion of commission, all other components of compensation are almost same between small and large firms. Proportion of commission is higher for large firms. Therefore, it indicates, on average, large firm's board compensation is more tied up with firm performance. Table 1 also depicts that, when CEO is relative of the founder of the firm, not only whole board compensation increases but also proportion of commission increases (22.5 percent) and other fixed components of compensation decreases. Therefore, it indicates that in the presence of representative of the founder in the board as CEO, board compensation is more tied up with the performance of the firm.
Average total compensation of the board as well as the total commission paid to the board are the highest for the sample, where COUNT > 9, Rs.8.0 million and Rs.3.44 million respectively. When number of products below 9 the total board compensation is quite less and it varies from Rs.4.4-4.7 million. This indicates the fact that board get some advantage through diversification in terms of compensation.
Average size of the board (SIZE) of my sample is 11 for all the firms. For the small and large firms average board size are 9 and 12 respectively. Similarly for the cases, where COUNT ≤ 3, in between 4 and 9 and > 9, mean board size are 10, 11 and 12 respectively. This implies that board size board size increases with the increases in diversification because monitoring becomes difficult for large diversified firms. On average total number of NED in the board for large and small firms 7 and 6 respectively.
On average two-third of the board is occupied by NED. Large firms have lesser proportion of NED (62 percent) in the board than the small firms (66 percent). But the proportion of NED is quite less when the CEO of the board is related to the founder (58 percent). This indicates that small firms and the firms where CEO comes from outside have better monitoring norm than others and as a consequence total compensation to the board especially to the executive directors, including CEO, decreases. This is supported by the high negative correlation coefficient between PROP_NED and D_LARGE and D_REL in Table 2 .
All the measures of diversification are more for the large firms than the small firms, which is quite natural. Means of the number of product produced by the firm (COUNT) for the all, large and small firms cases are 8, 9 and 5. For the firms where CEO is relative of the founder group, average COUNT is 7. Product diversification index (DIVERSE) is also more for the large firms than the small firms. DIVERSE for the all, large and small firms cases are 0.431, 0.487 and 0.362 respectively. Similarly, for geographical diversification (LOCATION), number of plant in different geographical location, is more for the large firms. Obviously all the measures of diversification is higher for the case where COUNT > 9. One interesting point to note is stock return volatility is lower for the case of large firms and COUNT>9 cases only.
From Table 2 some more interesting features of Indian corporate sector came out very clearly and also support the findings from descriptive statistics. There is significant positive correlation between large firms and the group-affiliated firms i.e., most of the large firms in India belong to business group. Large firms and firms belong to business group have a positive correlation with diversification of the firm. In other words as the firm become larger, it diversifies more. There is also strong positive correlation between product diversification (COUNT or DIVERSE) and geographical diversification (LOCATION). Level of diversification and size of the board has positive correlation but level of diversification and proportion of NED in the board has negative correlation. If the CEO is Chairman or related to the founder then diversification is quite less.
Diversification of the firm decreases with the increase in the proportion of NED in the board.
Empirical Results
Determination of Board Compensation
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix show some light on the relation between board compensation and other economic indicators of the firm in bivariate form.
But it needs to be confirmed in multivariate framework. In this section, in Table 3, I analyse the determinant of board compensation by using fixed effect OLS and for determining different components of compensation in Table 4 , I use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) after checking for auto-correlation and hetroscedasticity. Table 3 shows that ROA of current year as well as previous year have positive and significant effect on the total compensation (TC) of the board for all the five panels i.e., all firms, large firms, small firms group-affiliated firms and standalone firms. For 1 percent increase in ROA in the current and previous year, compensation of the board increases by 1.8 percent and 2.05 percent respectively. This implies that past year performance has greater influence on determining the board compensation than the current year performance of the firm, especially for the small firms' sample. For the large firms, only current year performance, in terms of ROA, has positive significant effect on total compensation. For 1 percent increase in current year ROA, total compensation of the board increase by 1.84 percent. Neither current year nor the past year Adjusted Tobin's Q (ADJQ) has any significant effect in determining the board compensation for large as well as small firms.
A. Firm Performance
For the firms belong to business group in India receive less amount of board compensation. The dummy D_GROUP has negative significant effect on board compensation. Current year as well as past year firm performance in terms of both ROA and ADJQ have positive significant effect in determining the board compensation. For 1 percent increase in ADJQ in both current and past year, compensation of the board increases by 1.4 percent. For this sample of firms, current as well as past year ROA also have significant positive influence on board compensation. Past year ROA has greater influence (2.13 percent) than current year ROA (1.8 percent) on determining the board compensation. For the sample of standalone firms, only current and past year ROA of the firm has positive significant effect on board compensation. From this analysis we can conclude that compensation of Indian corporate board significantly (at 95% level) depends on current and past year performance of the firm, especially for the group affiliated firm.
Though total board compensation is tied up with firm performance but all the components of board compensation do not depend on the firm performance. Table 4 shows only salary and commission components of the board compensation are tied up with firm performance. Salary is apparently the largest component of compensation, which is payable to only executive directors. Table 4 , in this analysis shows, for 1 percent increase in ROA in current and previous year, salary, payable to only executive directors increases by 1 percent and 1.5 percent respectively. Similarly for 1 percent increase in ADJQ in both current and previous year, salary of the executive directors in the board increases by 1 percent. For 1 percent increase in ROA in current and previous year, commission of the board 4.9 percent and 2.3 percent respectively. ADJQ has no significant effect on determining the commission of the board. Intuition is, commission, payable to whole board, is calculated on the basis current year accounting based profit, whereas, salary is determined on the basis of overall performance of the firm. Therefore, current year accounting based performance measure of the firm has greater influence on determining the commission of the board. Firm performance has no significant influence on perquisites and sitting fees of the board. Past year ROA of the firm has positive influence on determining the current year sitting fees, payable to outside directors, of the board. This implies that if the firm perform better in the previous year, firm increase sitting fees to the outside director.
Risk is another indicator of firm performance. As the volatility or standard deviation of the stock return (RISK) of the last month of the financial year increases, the compensation of the board falls for all firms irrespective of size or affiliation from the group. The percentage of decrease in board compensation is more for large firms or firms belong to business group due to increase in RISK. RISK also adversely affects the different components of executive directors compensation i.e., salary commission and perquisites. I have tried with the volatility of stock return for full year instead of volatility of last month of the financial year. But it has no significant effect on board compensation. Adverse impact of the volatility of the stock return on the compensation indicates the fact that shareholders are risk averse and they do not have long-term or persisting memory of stock price on setting the compensation. Only the volatility of the stock-price during the last month of the financial year has effect on the setting of compensation.
B. Internal Monitoring
As the number of directors in the board (BOD_SIZE) increases, total compensation of the board also increases which is quite obvious. But this result can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is, as the board size increases free riding problem also increases and as an immediate consequence monitoring decreases.
Therefore, all the executive directors increase their compensation, especially the fixed components. Other interpretation can be, as the size of the board increases, monitoring of the board also increases. Therefore, firm performance also improved and as a rewards compensation of the board increases. Table 3 shows as the board size increases by one member, board compensation increases by 8.2%. For the large firm, it is 7.6%. For the group-affiliated firms, for increase in one member in the board, the increase in board compensation is highest (9.2%) and for the standalone firms it is the lowest (6.5%). Table   4 shows, as the board member increases, both fixed as well as variable components of compensation (commission) increase. Salary, commission and perquisites increase by 7.1%, 8.2% and 8.7% respectively. Sitting fees, payable to the NED, also increase by 6.9%. Therefore, from this analysis one can conclude that as the board size increase compensation for both executive and non-executive director increases. Not only fixed components of the compensation increase, but performance based component of compensation also increases. This implies that this increase in compensation is mainly due to increase in performance of the firm.
As the proportion of NED increases, Table 3 shows, board compensation decreases significantly for the small firm and group affiliated firms. For one percent increase in proportion of NED in the board, compensation of the board decreases by 0.62% and 0.40% for small and group affiliated firm respectively. For increase in proportion of NED fixed components, especially salary, decreases but the compensation to the NED i.e., sitting fees increases significantly. Table 4 shows that for one percent increase in proportion of NED, salary decreases by 0.71% but sitting fees increase by 1.04%. Other components do not change significantly.
Identification of the CEO has great influence in determining the compensation. If the CEO of the firm is also the Chairman of the firm, board compensation increases by 16.4%, especially for the small firms and group-affiliated firms. Table 3 shows, as the CEO become the Chairman of the of the board compensation for the small firm or groupaffiliated firm increase by 21%. Different components of the compensation do not get influenced by whether the CEO is Chairman. When the CEO is related to the founder data reveals that most of the other executives or NED are also related to the founder. In this case, Table 3 shows, compensation increase by 26% and for the large firm it is 57.6%. For the group-affiliated firm, it increases by 34%. Interestingly, this huge amount of increase in compensation is done by mostly increase in commission i.e., performance based component of compensation. Table 4 shows when CEO is relative of the founder commission increase by 53%. If there is more than one CEO in the board then also compensation increase by around 27%. In this case, compensation increases through fixed components only. Both the fixed components of compensation increase by around 26%. This implies that free riding problem along with moral hazard problem kicks in when there is more than one CEO in the board.
In India the data on the equity holding by individuals like CEO or managers are not reported. Table A1 shows with the increase in shareholding by the promoter, total compensation increases, especially for the foreign promoter. For one percent increase in foreign promoter shareholding, total compensation increases by 0.7%, out of that, salary component increases by 0.9%. With the increase in government shareholding not only total compensation, but also all the major components of compensation fall significantly.
Same thing holds for private corporate body's shareholding.
C. Corporate Diversification
Corporate diversification is a very important factor in setting the compensation of the board. Table 3 shows that as the number of product produced by the firm increases the board compensation falls. But for increase in diversification index (DIVERSE), which is better measure for diversification than product count, compensation of the board increase. This implies that compensation does not increase with the increase in number of product, but it increases as the production of all those products become more uniform. Table 3 shows that for one percent increase in diversification index, compensation of the board increase by 0.53%. For the large firm, it increases by 0.87%. For the small firms, diversification does not give any extra compensation to the board. For one percent increase of DIVERSE, board compensation of the group affiliated firm increase by 0.65%, and for the standalone firm, it increase by 0.46% but not very significantly (at 95% confidence level) different from zero.
With the increase in diversification index compensation of the board increases mainly through fixed components of compensation. Table 4 shows for one percent increase in DIVERSE salary and perquisites increase by 0.52% and 0.50% respectively.
Commission increases by 0.40%, but that too is not very significant (at 95% confidence level). Intuition is, as the literature argued 18 that the value of the firm decreases with the increase in number of products. But as the amount of production of different products become more uniform, rather than highly skewed, diversification index increases and as a consequence operational complexity and risk of the firm increases. Therefore, 18 See Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) for the relevant literature.
compensation of the board increases, but mostly through fixed components of compensation.
As the total number of plants of the firm in different location i.e. geographical diversification increases, compensation of the board increases, especially for the firm belongs to business group. Again Table 3 shows that for one unit increase in geographical diversification (LOCATION), board compensation of the group affiliated firm increases by 1.6%. This increase in board compensation is done only through increase in fixed components of compensation. Table 4 shows for one unit increase in geographical diversification (LOCATION), salary and perquisites increase by 1.6% and 2.1% respectively whereas, sitting fees of the NED in the board decreases by 1.8%. Overall analysis of this section depicts the fact that with the increase in diversification (product or geographical or both), board of director especially executive directors get the scope to increase their compensation, especially the fixed components of compensation. Through the product diversification (DIVERSE) they try to show their capability of work under complex and challenging environment and through geographical diversification (LOCATION) they try to show their dynamisms. And in both the cases mostly fixed components of compensation only increase.
Determination of CEO compensation:
This section analyses the determinants of CEO compensation. Table 5 , shows the regression result of truncated model, which is quite different from determination of board compensation. It shows that only current year accounting based performance of the firm has positive and marginally significant effect on determining the compensation of the CEO(s). For one percent increase in ROA, CEO compensation increases by 0.47%. This implies that board compensation as a whole, is more tied up with firm performance than the CEO's individual compensation. My finding is little different from the findings by Rose and Shepard (1997); Brick et al. (2002) , who find current and past year market based as well as accounting based performance measure has significant effect on compensation of the CEO in US firms. In India this holds true only for the board compensation in group-affiliated firms.
In India, CEO compensation does not get affected significantly with the increase in board size. Table 5 shows, for one percent increase in proportion of NED in the board CEO compensation increases by 0.21%. My finding supports the finding of Core et al. (1999) , who also find positive correlation between proportion of NED and CEO compensation. In India, it is very hard to distinguish between independent NED and NED but not independent. In fact, most of the NEDs are not independent, because they come from the family of the founder of the firm. If the CEO is endowed with additional responsibility of Chairman of the board, compensation of the CEO increases by 7.3%.
This also supports the finding of Brickley et al. (1997) . In India CEO(s) are often selected from the relative of the founder group of the firm. If the CEO(s) are related to the founder of the firm, compensation of the CEO increases by 7.9%. In the above Table   3 , we have seen if the CEO is relative of the founder, board compensation increase by 26%. This implies when CEO is relative of the founder not only CEO compensation increase, but compensation of other board member also increases simultaneously.
Table 5 also shows that as the number of product increases compensation of the CEO falls. But CEO compensation increases with the increase in geographical diversification (LOCATION). Intuition is, as the number of product increases risk for the firm increase and it reveals the self-professing characteristics of the CEO. Therefore, the compensation of the CEO falls. However, as the geographical diversification increases, it reveals the dynamism characteristic of the CEO and this helps the CEO to bargain for better compensation from the firm. As the firm become bigger operational complexity increases and as a consequence compensation of the CEO increases very significantly.
Elasticity of CEO compensation with respect to sales is 0.14. Table 5 reveals the fact size of the firm and total number geographical locations of plants are more important factors in determining the compensation of CEO than compare to firm performance.
In the previous studies of India it is found that managerial compensation depends positively on the age, experience and education or schooling year of the managers 19 . This paper finds the result, different from the previous studies, which is shown in Saha and Sarkar (1999 ) the CEO i.e., number of years that he/she (may not be as CEO) serves the firm has a positive significant effect on the compensation. But the relation between infirmexperience and CEO compensation is non-linear in nature. Compensation of the CEO increases with the increase in infirm-experience but at decreasing rate. The interpretation is that informational rent plays a crucial role in determination of the CEO compensation.
If the CEO worked for larger periods in the firm he/she has more information about the firm and he/she can capitalised this information to increase his/her payoff. In India most of the firms are family based. CEOs of these firms are mostly related to the founder groups. For these CEOs, age does not matter, educational background of most of these CEOs are commerce graduate. They start their career from own family owned firm. This is the reason that infirm-experience turns out to be one of the most important factor in determining the compensation of the CEO. This increase in compensation is a reward to the CEO for being an honest and not covering up the losses by reducing the R&D expenditure.
Conclusion:
This paper examines the effect of possible factors those determine the compensation of the board and its components as well as compensation of the CEO(s).
The determinants of compensation used in this paper can be classified into four categories: performance of the firm, internal monitoring, firm diversification and other firm specific economic factors. This paper provides the evidence that current as well as previous year accounting based measure of firm performance (ROA) has positive significant effect on the board compensation. Market based measure of firm performance also has positive significant effect on board compensation but only for the group affiliated firms. This paper also provides the evidence that as size of the board increases total compensation of the board as well as its different components also increase.
Proportion of NED has significant negative effect on total compensation of the board as well as the salary component. If the CEO is Chairman of the board then it helps to increase the compensation of the board for the small and the group-affiliated firms only.
When CEO is selected from the relative of the founder group or if there is more than one CEO in the board then it helps to increase the board compensation. Compensation of the board increases with the increase in the diversification index of the firm.
Regarding CEO compensation, this paper shows that size of the firm is more significant important factor for determining the CEO compensation than the performance of the firm. Compensation of the CEO increases with the increase in proportion of NED.
Among the personnel attributes, CEO compensation increases with the increase in infirm experience of the firm but at a decreasing rate. This shows that board compensation as a whole is more tied up with the performance of the firm than the CEO compensation.
This paper can be further enriched if one can get the data on the employee stock option plan (ESOP). Till 2002 it was not mandatory for the firm to report the stock holding by the CEO and other directors in the board. In future it is expected to have this data in the annual reports and therefore, this work can be extended with this data. 
